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proposed in the Presidents 1968 Tax Message'5 2 which noted the
necessity for legislation due to the lack of certainty and uniformity

in this area. Briefly, it provided for a 20 mile radius designated as
the "duty area" inside of which no commuting would be deductible.
This "duty area" would center around the taxpayer's principle post of
duty, or in the proper circumstances, around his residence. The

proposal also recognized the "temporary" employment exception in
situations in which the employment lasted less than one year. Hopefully, as a result of Correll, Congress will now take the initiative and
provide some relief to the taxpayer who does not wish to spend the
night.
Philip W. Moss

LABOR LAW-RAILWAY LABOR ACT § 2 (FIRST) GOOD
FAITH PROVISION: ACCOMMODATION OR RETURN
TO JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN LABOR DISPUTES

The paramount objectives of the Railway Labor Act1 [hereinafter
RLA] are to avoid any interruption in interstate commerce and to
promote harmony between the carriers and their employees by estab2
lishing collective bargaining machinery designed to prevent strikes.
To effectuate these objectives, Congress, in § 2 of the RLA, set forth
152 The 1963 Proposalof the Treasury Department,Hearings on the President's
Tax Message before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 98 (1963).

1Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 [codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88

(1964)].

Id. § 151(a) sets forth the general purposes of the RLA as follows:
The purposes of the chapter are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of
any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom
of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization;
(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of
this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of
all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5)
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions....
See Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 565 (1930).
2
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a number of statutory commands. 3 § 2 (First), the first sub-section4
under § 2, is the foremost command within this statutory scheme.
It imposes a duty on the parties to bargain collectively in good faith
by providing that the parties are "to exert every reasonable effort"

to settle their disputes. The good faith requirement extends to each
specific aspect of the statutory scheme of the RLA: conference, conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration. 5
This comment presents a discussion of whether an injunction can
be issued to prevent a strike until it is ascertained if the good faith
duty to bargain has been violated even though the parties have
attempted to comply with and have exhausted the mandatory provisions of the ULA. Such a situation was recently presented in Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United TransportationUnion.6 In
8 The Court, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 869 (1969), discussed the procedure required in attempting to reach a
settlement in a major dispute as follows:
The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary
settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice.
§ 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National
Mediation Board which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds
a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must
endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding
arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. H§ 5
First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens 'substantially
to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any
section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation
Board shall notify the President, who may create an emergency board to
investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working
its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the
status quo. § 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10. Id. at 378.
445 U.S.C. § 152 (First) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents and employees to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes..., in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and
the employer thereof.
The Court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 377 (1969) referred to this section as the "heart of the [RLA]."
5 See note 3 supra, and accompanying text. See also Bryer, The Railway

Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act-A Comparison, 44 W. VA. L.Q.

1, 2 (1937); Comment, 30 MD. L. BRv. 162, 164 (1970).
6 91 S.Ct. 1731 (1971). The carrier seeking injunctive relief filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that the union had failed to perform its
obligations under § 2 (First) of the RLA to bargain in good faith. These
allegations were founded on the contention that the union entered the negotiations
with a fixed opinion and refused to engage in national handling of the dispute.
The union answered by contending that § 4, 7, and 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue an anti-strike injunction.
Finding that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether § 2 (First) was complied with in good faith, since all the other procedures of the RLA were
exhausted, the district court held that §§ 4 and 7 prohibited the enjoining of a
(continued on next page)
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this case, the Supreme Court held that the good faith provision of § 2
(First) is enforceable through the issuance of a judicial strike injunction, notwithstanding the anti-strike injunction provision of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.7 Since it is a statutory duty on the parties to
exhaust the requirements established by the BLA before resorting to economic self-help, 8 the result reached in Chicago & North Western Rail(Footnote continued from preceding page)

strike. It appears that this court believed the matter to be one for administrative
determination by the National Mediation Board rather than presenting a
justiciable issue. However, an injunction was granted pending an appeal of its
decision of the justiciability of § 2 (First). Upon review the federal Court of
Appeals affirmed. 422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970). It was the holding of this court
that the enforcement of § 2 (First) was a matter solely for the National Mediation
Board.
7Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70 [codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1964)]. The union relied on § 104 which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are
herein defined) from doing whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;...
8 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 378 (1971). Classification of a dispute as either major or minor is important
because it determines the administrative procedures for processing these two
categories of labor controversies. Although the terms major or minor will not be
found in the BLA "it is commonly recognized that the RLA provides for two
different procedures, each of which had different legal consequences." Siegel &
Lawton, Stalemate in 'Major' Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act-The President and Congress,32 CEO. WASH. L. Rv. 8 (1963). In Elgin, J. &.E. Ry. Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), the Court discussed the distinctions between these
two classes of disputes:
The first [major disputes] relates to disputes over the formation of
collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there
is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one,
and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls
the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not
to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.
The second class [minor disputes], however, contemplates the
existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a
situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change
in terms or to create a new one.... [T]he claim is to rights accrued, not
merely to have new ones created for the future. Id. at 723.
The procedure of processing a minor dispute results in final, binding
arbitration if the parties cannot reach an agreement during negotiation. Therefore
the Court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R. Co., 353
U.S. 30, 34 (1957) held that self-help in the form of a strike would be barred
because such action would be inconsistent with this procedure since a reasonable
alternative has been offered to the parties. Otherwise, this procedure would
be rendered meaningless.
While there is a mandatory duty to follow the detailed procedure in a major
dispute, there is no compulsion to agree at any stage of the proceedings and a
strike after the exhaustion of the various steps would be consistent with the
purposes of the Act. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.
(Continued on next page)
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way Co. would appear reasonable since § 2 (First) is one of the provisions to be exhausted. However, the Court did not provide any
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Coast Ry. Co., 384 U.S. 238, 244 (1966); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co.., 372 U.S. 284, 290 (1963); The Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1960); Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945); American Airlines, Inc.,
v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). If the
parties cannot reach voluntary agreement, there is no final decision like that
mnposed by the Railroad Adjustment Board in a minor dispute. Id. at 784.
"Indeed, the unquestioned right to resort to self-help is the inevitable alternative
in a statutory scheme which deliberately denies the final power to compel
arbitration." Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336
F.2d 172, 181 (5th Cir. 1964). It should be remembered that the procedures
of a major dispute settlement are long and drawn-out with cooling-off periods and
the maintenance of the status quo or freeze periods so that the parties will be
induced to reach a peaceful settlement without resorting to economic self-help.
The major-minor distinction would seem to be an adequate aid to judicial
handling of railway labor disputes. However "[o]ne of the many reasons why
the [RLA] is regarded as an anachronism in labor relations law is that its classification of disputes into major and minor is no longer all-inclusive." McGuinn,
InJunctive Powers of the Federal Courts In Cases Involving Disputes Under the
Railway
Labor
50 GEO. L.J.
65 (1961).
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guidelines as to what may represent a "reasonable effort" but rather
it deferred the question to the discretion of the federal district court.9
Although recognizing that clarity is lacking in its decision, the Court
suggests that the result reached was unavoidable if the objectives of
the RLA are to be fulfilled.10
Collective bargaining in the railroad industry has received extensive treatment from Congress. The original RLA and its amendments
are the culmination of a variety of legislation which attempted to
provide an effective means to attain a peaceful settlement to the recurring labor problems. Prior to the enactment of the RLA, the peaceful
settlement of railroad labor controversies was impeded by weak
statutes which afforded few alternatives to the strike in resolving
disputes." The earliest attempt to give relief to labor strife in the
railroad industry was the Arbitration Act of 188812 which was enacted
one year after the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.1 3 The
Arbitration Act provided for the voluntary arbitration and investigation of labor disputes by ad hoc commissions. Even though the
Arbitration Act was in effect for ten years, the arbitration provisions
were never utilized and the investigatory provisions were only used
once, but to no avail, in attempting to prevent the disastrous Pullman
strike of 1894.14 Following the Arbitration Act, the Erdman Act 15
was enacted in 1898 and its policy formulated the application of
mediation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration to resolve railroad
labor disputes. In 1913, the Newlands Act' 6 created a permanent
Board of Mediation and Conciliation, the first full-time Board established. Under the Newlands Act, the unions became dissatisfied with
the Board's procedures of interpreting mediated agreements and
arbitration awards since these procedures were rudimentary in form

9 The court candidly skirted this issue in stating:
The parties have not requested us to decide whether the allegations of the
complaint or the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to
show a violation of § 2 First, and the lower courts, by their resolution of
the threshold questions, did not reach the issue. Accordingly we intimate
no view on this matter. 91 S.Ct. at 1734.
10 The Court's opinion suggests that the obligation created under § 2 (First)
is central to the effective working of the RLA. Therefore the "strictest compliance
with the formal procedures of the Act is meaningless if one party goes through
the motions with 'a desire not to reach an agreement."'

91 S. Ct. at 1736, citing

in part, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953).
11 Wisehart, TransportationStrike Control Legislation: A CongressionalChallenge, 66 MicH. L. Rv. 1697, 1701 (1968).
12 Act of October 1, 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501.
3. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, cl. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
14 Byrer, 44 W. VA. L Q. supra note 5, at 6.
15 Act of June 1, 1898, cia. 370, 50 Stat. 424.
16 Act of July 15, 1918, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103.
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and it appeared to the unions that management had attempted to
assert a voice in their interpretation.lT
During World War I the federal government assumed control of
the railroads.' 8 This period of time found the unions very active and
optimistic because of a large increase in membership, and, "for the
first time in history, railroad employees were thoroughly organized
under an employer who gave them sympathetic recognition and nationwide rules built around the cherished principles of seniority, reasonable
hours, [and] security against arbitrary discharge... ."" Although the
unions supported government control of the railroads, government
operation was not economically successful and after the close of the
20
war the railroads were returned to private ownership.
The last major legislation prior to enactment of the BLA was the
Transportation Act of 1920.21 This act made provisions for hearings
and investigations of disputes by the United States Railroad Labor
Board in substitution for mediation. However, Congress made the
mistake of also charging the Board with quasi-legislative functions
such as making rules and passing on wage demands.22 In combining
legislative and judicial functions under the same Board, the impartial
atmosphere required for effective judicial decision-making was destroyed.23 In applying narrow interpretations to the Board's authority,
17 Wisehart, 66 MIcH. L. REv., supra note 11 at 1700.
18 40 Stat. 1733 (Proclamation of President Wilson, Dec. 26, 1917).
19 Garrison, The National RailroadAdjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YAIr L.J. 567, 570-71 (1937).
20 In fact, a Senator commented that government operation of the railroads
created "the most tangled mess that could possibly be imagined." 113 CONG. RPEc.
14967 (1967) (statement of Senator Holland).
See Pomerene, Our Recent Federal Railroad Legislation, 55 Am. L. RBv. 364
(1921) for a detailed analysis of the government control of the railroads and the
Plumb Plan to continue such control put forth on behalf of labor out of the
fear that if control of the roads were turned back to private ownership, the wages
and other gains made during governmental operation would be lost.
To illustrate the feeling of the general public at this time, the following may
be of interest to the reader:
fT]here never will be more than one nationwide strike in this country on
the railroads. And if that one strike comes, the American people will send
to Congress men who will have the courage to do their bidding, and not
quake like aspen leaves before a few lobbyists in Washington. The great
American people are patient and long-suffering, but they can be aroused
and when they are aroused there will be a great upswell which will cast
aside the autocrats of the country as the great billows of the ocean toss
about the flotsam and jetsam of the sea. Id.at 392.
2141
Stat. 456 (1920).
22
Garrison, 46 YALE L.J., supra note 19, at 572. This mistake was not made
in the BLA. By amendment in 1934, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
was established to act as a judicial body in minor disputes, while the National
Mediation Board was to have no adjudicatory authority with regard to major
disputes but merely served to persuade the parties and thereby preserved its
ability to mediate.
23

Id.
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the Court severely restricted its effectiveness. 24 The Board's recommendations in the form of "decisions" were held enforceable only to
the extent that public opinion would pressure acceptance of them.2 5
Thus, the parties were able to ignore the decisions of the Railroad
Labor Board since it was "armed only with the gentle, unenforceable
admonitions of the Transportation Act, 1920."26 The need for Congressional action became apparent and in the President's message to
this body in 1923 he suggested that "if an agreement could be reached
between employers and employees, there should be no hesitation in
27
enacting such agreement into law."
After being urged to sit down and develop a workable solution for
settling disputes in their industry, the representatives of labor and
with
management agreed on proposing a bill to Congress and this bill
28
only minor technical changes later became enacted as the RLA.
It is a remarkable fact that all parties concerned were able to lay
aside the hostile feelings and suspicions that had too often characterized past negotiations and to act upon the belief that if an
agreement were reached, it would be carried out in the same
spirit 29of good faith and fair dealing that characterized the negotiations.

The significance of the passage of this act in the same form as suggested by the parties involved is founded on the premise that if both
parties were satisfied, success in the form of peaceful settlements to
disputes would be forthcoming. At the time of enactment it was suggested that the "new [BLA] conforms to the spirit of the times in
leaving industry to settle its own labor relations without public intervention."80
The procedure to prevent crippling strikes to the railroad industry
is dependent upon the good faith of the parties in conjunction with
24Se
Wisehart, 66 Micig. L. REv., supra note 12, at 1701.
25
In Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. United States Labor Bd.,

261 U.S. 72 79

(1923) the Court interpreted the Congressional intent behind the scheme ofT the

Transportation Act of 1920 to be enforceable through public criticism rather than

being enforceable by process. This intent was premised on the belief that the
economic interest of the public in the free flow of interstate commerce was so

important that a labor dispute would draw public attention to the side which the
Labor Board found to be at fault. See Pennsylvania R.R. System & Federation v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925) where a situation was presented
in which the carrier made every attempt to avoid compliance with a Railroad
Labor26Board decision but the Court maintained that this decision was enforceable.
Hooper, Labor, Railroads and the Public, 9 A.B.A.J. 15 (1923).
27
Chamberlain, The Railway Labor Act, 12 A.B.A.J. 633 (1926).
28
See Chamberlain, 12 A.B.A.J., supra note 27; Garrison, 46 YAix L.J., supra
note 219.
9
Hearing on H.R. 7180 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 21-22 (1926).
30 -, New Railroad Labor Law, 16 Am. LAB. LEG. REv. 140, 141 (1926).
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the persuasion applied by the Mediation Board in major disputes.
Although the Transportation Act's good faith provision set forth in
§ 301, Title III, was substantially reenacted in § 2 (First) of the RLA,
the Supreme Court, in Virginian Railway v. System Federation No.
40,31 held that this provision was an enforceable legal obligation and
thus, the moral force of public opinion concerning the first act was
abandoned. In determining congressional intent the Court looked at
the changes made in the BLA especially in the sections following § 2
(First) which impose mandatory procedures on the parties. Indicators
used by the Court to ascertain this congressional intent were found in
§ 2 (First)'s place in the scheme of the Act in conjunction with the
general duty to bargain which it promulgated. Its relation to the Act's
successful operation, as put forth in the sections following § 2, was
deemed imperative 32 Further, the 1934 amendments to the RLA provided for the establishment of two boards: the National Railroad
Adjustment Board, which was charged only with judicial duties in
minor disputes and the National Mediation Board, which only had
the duty to mediate in major disputes. In separating these two functions the RLA corrected the mistake made in the Transportation Act
which charged the Railroad Labor Board with both functions.8 3
During the period of railway labor law development, the federal
courts enjoyed jurisdiction over a broad range of union activities.
Through the abuse in issuance of injunctive relief,34 these courts
formulated a substantive labor policy. And, since the federal judges
were not furnished with legislative guidelines, their decisions to
prevent the union's use of economic power reflected their conservative
social and political views 3 5 Injunctions were issued to provide swift
relief to abate a strike's fervor, but provided no solution or reasonable
alternative to the underlying problem at hand.
31300
32

U.S. 515 (1937).

In Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of By. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930), the court profoundly noted:
While an affirmative declaration of duty contained in a legislative enactment may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in terms, a
definite statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart the declared
urpose of the legslation cannot be disregarded. Id. at 568.
34sSee notes 22 and 23 supra, and accompanying text.
See generally Aaron 10UCL...Rv., supra note 9; Bartosic, Injunction
and Section 801: The atiworkc of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric
Of National Labor Policy, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 980 (1969); F. FRN xuEn~ & N.
(1930); C. GRE oRY, LABoR AND Trm LAw
GRmNE, THE LABoR IINjuc i
91-104 (2d ed. 1958); Wimberley, The Labor Injunction-Past, Present, and
Future, 22 S.C.L. REv. 689 (1970); Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16
Mnn . L. REV. 638, 643 (1932); 70 YAI. L.J., supra note 8; Comment, 14
DEPAuL L. REv. 94 (194).
35 70 YALE L.J., supra note 8, at 71.
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The Clayton Act 6 was an early attempt to limit the issuance of
injunctions in labor disputes, but this attempt was unsuccessful because
the courts did not perceive any intent on the part of Congress to state
the law in any different manner than as bad been established in
previous judicial decisions. 37 After many such setbacks the struggle
to curb injunction abuses successfully culminated in passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to the problems of management-labor relations and its provisions
were broadly interpreted by the courts. Thus, it effectively removed
the federal district courts from the scene of labor-management bargaining relations and labor policy-making.38 The significance of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is founded on the fact that organized labor
could now fend for itself without judicial interference.3 9
The basic language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is violated when
an injunction is issued against a strike during a labor dispute. On the
other hand, the RLA establishes substantive rights and duties which
require judicial enforcement, since the Act does not provide any
machinery for compelling the parties to bargain collectively.40 Thus,
if an injunction is issued in a situation which the Norris-LaGuardia
Act protects from such action, the anti-injunction statute is violated.
However, if no injunction is issued the basic commands of the RLA
itself are threatened. Therefore a situation may be presented, such as
occurred in Chicago & North Western Railway, where these two statutes came into direct conflict.
After the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Virginian Railway
was the first case which permitted injunctive relief. In this case the
Court held that an injunction could issue where the union or the
employer refused to enter into negotiations for the settlement of a
labor dispute as contemplated by § 2 (First). The Court believed
that the mandatory provisions of the RLA (which included preliminary
negotiations) "cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more
general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."41 In Steele v. Louis-

3638 Stat. 730 (1914).
37
Comment,
38

59 Ky. L.J. 755, 758 (1971).
See Aaron, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 8, at 300; Bartosic, 69 CoLum.
L. REv., supra note 34, at 983; Wimberley, 22 S.C.L. REV., supra note 34, at 690;
70 YALE L.J., supra note 9, at 73; Comment, 14 VAND. L. REV. 662, 666 (1961).
39 Wimberley, 22 S.C.L. REv., supra note 34, at 697.
40

The Court in Steele v. Louisville &N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) stated:
[T]here is no mode of enforcement other than resort to the courts, whose
jurisdiction and duty to afford a remedy for a breach of statutory duty
are left unaffected. Id. at 207.
41
Virginian By. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937).
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ville & Nashville Railroad42 the Court held that an injunction could
issue to prevent a labor organization, as the sole collective bargaining
agent for a craft of employees, from discriminating against some
members because of their race. It has been suggested that these two
cases were justified by the Court on the ground that "the act [NorrisLaGuardia Act] was not intended to apply since the injunctions were
the only effective means of protecting the rights of the employees, who
were the intended beneficiaries of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" 43
In Brotherhoodof Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
Railroad Co.,44 the Court, for the first time, held that even though a
strike was specifically protected from injunctive relief by § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, an injunction could issue in a minor dispute in
order to preserve the procedures set out in the BLA. Although the
legislative history of the RLA paid little attention to accommodating
these policies, 45 the Court articulated an accommodation doctrine to
46
reconcile the purposes of each enactment.
Thus, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed primarily to protect
the union's right to strike as an economic weapon in collective bargaining situations. 47 However, railway disputes are unlike those which
cause the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be enacted. Reasonable alternatives
in the form of administrative procedures are provided in the RLA
and in major disputes, the strike is available upon exhaustion of these
procedures.
The first case to extend the accommodation rationale to major dis42323 U.S. 192 (1944). See Brotherhood of B.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,43323 U.S. 210 (1944).
Comment, 70 HAnv. L. rEv. 739, 740 (1957).

44 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
45 See Aaron, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 8, at 301-2. Representative La
Guardia was asked if the Norris-LaGuardia Act would entirely bar injunctive
relief in railroad disputes. In response to this question he replied that the RLA
"takes care of the whole labor situation pertaining to railroads. They could not
possibly come under this for the reason that we provided the machinery there for

settling
labor disputes." 75 CONG. REc. 5499 (1933).
4

6 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R. Co., 353 U.S.
30, 40 (1957). The doctrine of accommodation interlaces the provisions of these
two conflicting statutes. It would appear that this doctrine is the result of balancing
the importance or significance of the RLA provision against the more general
provisions of the anti-injunction statute. The question which must be asked in a

particular situation is whether injunctive relief, otherwise unavailable, should be
ganted to prevent negation of the congressional policy established to settle labor
disputes. A situation should not be permitted to exist where the denial of injunctive
relief would undermine the major policy of the ELA. See Wimberley, 22 S.C. L.
REv., supranote 35, at 704; 70 HAnv. L. Rxv., supra note 44, at 741.
47 See Brotherhood of R.B. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R. Co., 353 U.S.
30, 40 (1957); see also, Aaron, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 8, at 305.
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putes was Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association International.48 Going beyond the theory that the doctrine preserved jurisdiction to issue an anti-strike injunction in major disputes, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals extended it in such a manner so as to apply
it even after the RLA provisions have been exhausted in good faith.
On the face of the BLA no specific mention is made of good faith
bargaining. Nevertheless, "such a requirement has been implied from

the language of § 2 (First) interpreted in light of the history of the
'good faith' provisions of the National Labor Relations Act" [hereinafter NLRA]. 49 The Supreme Court has held that § 2 (First) is a
preliminary step in the RLA procedure of collective bargaining which
must be met if agreement between the parties is to be accomplished.50

However, the case precedent which has developed concerning this
section has been primarily related to fact situations in which there
was an outright refusal to bargain. 51 Professor Cox has defined good
faith bargaining as related to the NLRA (which can also be applied
to the RLA) 52 as follows: "The employer (or union) must engage in
negotiations with a sincere desire to reach an agreement and must
make an earnest effort to reach a common ground. . . ."5 It is not

enough to merely go through the motions.5 4 But, beyond a refusal to
bargain, very few cases have established a detailed analysis of the
factors required to constitute a good faith effort to negotiate.5 5 The
few cases which have discussed the requirements constituting good
48416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969).
49 Comment, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 798, 799 (1961).
50 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).

51 See, e.g., Brotherhood of By. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 384
U.S. 238 (1966); The Order of R.R Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362
U.S. 330 (1960); Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515
(1937).
52 Since there has been no helpful case precedent under the RLA, courts have
applied the standards of good faith bargaining from the National Labor Relations
Board's interpretation of good faith provisions under the NLRA. See, e.g., Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944); Norfolk & P.B. Line R.R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 45 n.6 (4th Cir. 1957);
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 201 F.2d 36, 40
(4th Cir. 1953); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn Intl, 169 F.Supp.
777, 793-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
5a Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 EIAuv. L. Bxv. 1401, 1416
(1958).
54 Long Island R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F.Supp. 356,
358 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
55 See Harper, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. Am. L. &
CoM. 3, 38 (1969). In American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 169
F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) the court noted:
The requirement of good faith bargaining is really a requirement of
absence of bad faith. In order to show such lack of good faith it is
necessary to establish facts from which it can be reasonably inferred
that a party enters upon a course of bargaining and pursues it with the
desire or intent not to enter into an agreement at all. Id. at 794.
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faith have relied on NLBA precedents.5 6 It has been suggested that
the basic test applied to establish good faith is determined by the
totality of the circumstances i.e., whether the conduct of the parties on
the whole has satisfied or violated the duty to "exert every reasonable
effort to make and maintain agreements."57 It does appear that even
if a settlement is not reached the parties are required to make a good
58
faith effort to utilize the BLA procedures.
Chicago & North Western Railway Co., presented the Court with a
situation in which the federal courts of appeals had expressed
divergent views.5 9 In holding that strike injunctions could issue to
effectively enforce the duty of § 2 (First) to "exert every reasonable
effort" the majority recognized that the decision fell short of desired
definiteness and clarity due to the vagueness of the obligation of a
good faith effort.00 The Court noted that there might be a possibility
that this ambiguity could "provide a cover for freewheeling judicial
interference in labor relations of the sort that called forth the NorrisLaGuardia Act... ."1 However, the Court believed that application
of the accommodation doctrine was necessary to give effect to this
section of the RLA.
The dissent declared that once the step-by-step procedures prescribed by the RLA have been exhausted, the parties are free to resort
to self-help. In suggesting that the majority had in fact destroyed the
scheme of "gradually escalating pressures," it was stated by Mr.
Justice Brennan that:
In essence, the Court holds that a district court has the duty under
§ 2 (First), to assess the bargaining tactics of each of the parties
after the entire statutory scheme has run its course. If then, the
court determines that a party had not exerted sufficient effort to
reach settlement, it should enjoin self-help measures, and, if such
action is to make any sense within this statutory scheme, remand
the parties to some unspecified point in the bargaining process.
Such a notion is entirely contrary to the carefully constructed
premise of the [RLA].62
5

See the cases compiled in note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
Harper, 35 J. Am L. &CoM. supra note 55, at 36. See Chicago R.I. &Pac.
R.R. v. Switchmen's Union 292 F.2A 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1961); American Airlines Inc.
v. Air58Line Pilots Ass'n Intl, 169 F. Supp. 777, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
See notes 3 and 4 supra, and accompanying text.
59 Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 425 F.2d 1086 (2d
Cir. 1970); Piedmont Aviation Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intl, 416 F.2d 633
(4th Cir. 1969); United Industrial Workers v. Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320
5th Cir. 1968); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 385 F.2d
581 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Contra Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union,
422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
6091 S. Ct. at 1738.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1744-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57
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Therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act provisions must be accommodated with those of the RLA so that the duty imposed by § 2 (First)
would be enforceable through the issuance of an injunction. However,
it may be asked whether the Court in effect thwarted self-help through
injunctive relief proscribed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act? Are the
federal district courts to return to the injunction business? If the RLA
has become ineffective, is it not for Congress and not the Court to
redress the deficiencies?63 But perhaps, the federal district courts are
capable of making inquiries into a good faith situation presented in
the RLA as readily as they have inquired into § 8 Norris-LaGuardia
64
Act situations.
In retrospect, these questions cannot be answered today. Rather,
they await the decisions to be rendered by federal district courts.
Hopefully those decisions will not be substantive labor policy determinations but will rather yield to the administrative expertise
established by Congress.
John W. Oakley

RECENT STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AGAINST ARCHITECTS,
ENGINEERS, AND BUILDERS
The imposition of liability on those who design or construct
buildings and other structures on real property is in need of reexamination in light of recent legislation in a majority of states which
tends to severely limit the duration of civil liability of architects,
6a It has been recognized by at least one student of labor relations that:
[C]ongress has not hesitated to provide a remedy when the purposes of
the [RLA] could not be achieved through voluntary action. When
"free" collective bargaining would not work, Congress made it compulsory; when carriers would not stop interfering with unions, penalties
were added- when quarrels over the identity of the bargaining agent and
the scope of the bargaining unit blocked negotiations, Congress provided
for independent determination of such issues; and, when the parties were
unable to settle grievances, Congress provided for the mandatory resort
to adjustment boards .... Wisehart, 66 MicH. L. RIv., supra note 11, at
1710.
64 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964) provides in pertinent part as follows:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complaint
who has failed to comply with any obligation... or who has failed to
make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation
or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or
voluntary arbitration.

